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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case eBay Inc. (“eBay”) appeals from the trial court’s order
granting Mary Kay Inc.’s (“Mary Kay”) petition for a presuit deposition under Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure (“Order”). The trial court’s Order requires nonresident eBay to submit to deposition on written questions in
Dallas, during which eBay will be required to provide the
names and contact information of 48 anonymous eBay users
who might be selling Mary Kay products in violation of
contract, copyright, or trademark law. According to Mary
Kay, this information will be used in anticipated suits against
one or more of these anonymous eBay sellers, although Mary
Kay does not specify which claims it intends to assert against
which anonymous users, or whether these users are subject to
personal jurisdiction in Texas.
Parties

Respondent/Appellant is eBay Inc.
Petitioner/Appellee is Mary Kay Inc.

Trial Court

101st Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Hon.
Martin Lowy, Presiding.

Trial Court
Disposition

The trial court granted Mary Kay’s Verified Rule 202
Petition by Order signed on May 20, 2014.

Course of
Proceedings

After hearing argument and considering the parties’ filings
and affidavits, the trial court entered the Order that eBay has
appealed. This is an appeal of a final judgment. In re
Jorden, 249 S.W.3d 416, 419 (Tex. 2008) (trial court’s
ruling on a Rule 202 petition is a final, appealable order
when the petition seeks discovery from a witness against
whom a suit is not anticipated); IFS Sec. Grp., Inc. v. Am.
Equity Ins. Co., 175 S.W.3d 560, 563 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2005, no pet.) (same). On June 26, 2014, this Court issued a
stay of the district court’s order pending this appeal.
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REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant respectfully requests the opportunity to present oral argument.
This appeal involves the application of a recent decision by the Texas Supreme
Court, In re Doe (“Trooper”), --S.W.3d--, 2013 WL 9600953 (Tex. Aug. 29,
2014), and a separate issue of first impression in Texas about the limits on a
court’s power to order pre-suit discovery from a witness residing outside its
borders.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal because the trial court’s Order is
a final judgment, as eBay would not be a party in Mary Kay’s anticipated suit. See
In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d at 419 (trial court’s ruling on a Rule 202 petition is a
final, appealable order when the petition seeks discovery from a third party against
whom a suit is not contemplated); IFS, 175 S.W.3d at 563 (“[A]n order pursuant to
rule 202 allowing discovery against a third party not liable to the petitioner would
be final for purposes of appeal.”).

x

ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether the district court erred in granting Mary Kay’s Rule 202

Petition?
2.

Whether Rule 202 may be used to obtain the identities of anonymous

internet posters for use in an anticipated suit, absent any showing by the Rule 202
petitioner that the anticipated suit could be filed properly in a Texas court or that a
Texas court could exercise personal jurisdiction over the anonymous posters?
3.

Whether Rule 202 gives Texas courts the authority to reach outside

the State’s borders to compel a nonresident witness who will not be a party in any
anticipated suit to submit to a pre-suit deposition in Texas, without following the
procedures for obtaining testimony from a nonparty, nonresident witness in a
pending suit, including the requirements of Rule 201.1 and all applicable
requirements of the witness’s home jurisdiction?

xi

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case is one of several now pending before this Court and the district
courts of Dallas County and Collin County, in which Rule 202 is being improperly
exploited in ways that are inconsistent with the Texas Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Trooper and its warning in that case that Rule 202 should not be
interpreted “to make Texas the world’s inspector general.” 2013 WL 9600953, at
*5. All of these cases involve the resale on eBay.com of products originally
distributed by “multi-level marketing companies.”1 eBay is the world’s largest
online marketplace in which anyone, whether it be a business or individual
consumer, can buy and sell (and resale) a broad variety of goods. Multi-level
marketing companies sell their products through networks of “independent”
distributors, rather than directly to consumers. To protect this model and their
desired pricing structures, these companies often contractually prohibit their
distributors from reselling products on eBay.
Under the pretense of needing to “perpetuate” testimony for use in
“anticipated suits” against anonymous distributors in potential breach of this “no
eBay sales” prohibition, many multi-level marketing companies are turning to Rule
202 in an effort to force eBay to identify anonymous website users, so that the
companies can send threatening cease-and-desist letters to them. The number of
1

See infra at n. 6.

1

anonymous eBay users at issue in each Rule 202 proceeding varies, ranging from
the 48 users at issue in this appeal to the more than 15,000 users at issue in the
most recently-filed appeal.
A.

Mary Kay’s Multi-Level Marketing Model

Based in Dallas, Mary Kay is one of the multi-level marketing companies
seeking mass discovery from eBay through Rule 202 . CR7. Under its business
model, Mary Kay sells its cosmetics to Independent Beauty Consultants (“IBC’s”
or “Beauty Consultants”), who may then resell the products to consumers. Id.
Like other multi-level marketing companies, Mary Kay would prefer to have full
control over the resale of its products, so that consumers are only allowed to
purchase items from the company’s own independent consultants, at Mary Kay’s
suggested prices. CR8 (“Mary Kay does not authorize the sale of any of its
products or the use of its trademarks or trade dress on eBay.”).
One way Mary Kay attempts to control the aftermarket sales of its products,
including on eBay, is through the enforcement of its contractual rights against
Beauty Consultants. To become a Beauty Consultant, an individual must sign an
IBC Agreement.

CR7.

According to Mary Kay, the current version of that

Agreement prohibits Beauty Consultants from selling Mary Kay products online,

2

including through ecommerce websites.2

CR8.

But Mary Kay has made no

showing that any of the anonymous internet users it seeks to identify here are
current or former Beauty Consultants, who have signed a “no eBay sales”
agreement. And for any anonymous eBay users who are not Beauty Consultants or
who have not signed such an agreement, Mary Kay has no breach-of-contract
claims against them.
Another way that Mary Kay attempts to control the aftermarket resale of its
products is through the assertion of intellectual property claims—primarily
trademark claims—against resellers. CR9. But, again, Mary Kay’s ability to use
such claims to stamp-out the online aftermarket of its products is limited. It is well
established under the first-sale doctrine that “trademark law does not apply to the
sale of genuine goods bearing a true mark, even if the sale is without the mark
owner’s consent.” Matrix Essentials, Inc. v. Emporium Drug Mart, Inc., 988 F.2d
587, 590 (5th Cir. 1993) (quotation marks and citations omitted); Polymer Tech.
Corp. v. Mimran, 975 F.2d 58, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1992) (individual “who resells
trademarked goods without change is not liable for trademark infringement”). So
if a consumer purchases Mary Kay products from a Beauty Consultant, she has the

2

Apparently, this restriction was added only recently to the IBC Agreement, as previous versions
do not include this prohibition. CR102. It is unclear from the record in this case when Mary
Kay revised its Agreement and how many of its Beauty Consultants are bound by the new terms
prohibiting online resale of company products.

3

right to resell those products on eBay and to advertise them accurately as “Mary
Kay” products. See Matrix, 988 F.2d at 589-90 (unauthorized reseller of hair
products protected under first sale doctrine despite labels on products stating that
they were to be “Sold Only in Professional Salons”). Moreover, although Mary
Kay might contend that copyright law prohibits a reseller from using Mary Kay’s
photography or its verbatim product descriptions in the reseller’s own listing,
copyright law does not prevent a reseller from using her own photo of a “Mary
Kay”-branded product or describing the product in her own words. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 201(a).
B.

Mary Kay’s Rule 202 Petition to eBay

On April 1, 2014, Mary Kay served its Rule 202 Petition, seeking an order
compelling eBay to identify 48 anonymous users who might be selling Mary Kay
products on ebay.com in alleged violation of contract or intellectual property law.
CR8-9. Mary Kay states that it anticipates bringing “claims against one or more of
these persons or entities. . . .” CR9. These potential claims include “trademark
infringement, copyright infringement, breach of contract, unfair competition,
misappropriation of confidential information, and tortious interference with
contract.” Id. Mary Kay does not allege that it is anticipating filing any claims

4

against eBay. Thus, in any anticipated suit against eBay users, eBay would be a
nonparty witness.3
As eBay is not based in Texas, Mary Kay served its Rule 202 Petition on
eBay’s registered agent: National Registered Agents, Inc., 1999 Bryan St., Ste.
900, Dallas, Texas. CR7. In fact, eBay is a Delaware company with its principal
place of business in San Jose, California. CR14, 130, 138. Thus, eBay is a
California resident. 4 Mary Kay noted that it could not seek its requested discovery
from a court in California because “California law [Cal. C.C.P. § 2035.010(b)] . .
. expressly precludes the use of [pre-suit depositions] ‘for the purpose either of
ascertaining the possible existence of a cause of action or a defense to it, or of
identifying those who might be made parties to an action not yet filed.’” CR112.
So, in an attempted end-run around California discovery limitations, Mary Kay
filed this action in Texas, hoping to use Rule 202 as a “super subpoena” and the

3

This is not surprising, as eBay is not a party to the IBC Agreements Mary Kay seeks to enforce.
Moreover, courts have rejected attempts by rights-owners to hold eBay liable for the infringing
sales of third-party users of eBay’s website. See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d
93, 103-10 (2d Cir. 2010) (eBay cannot be held liable for third-party users’ sales of counterfeit
Tiffany products on its website).
4

Because eBay maintains its headquarters in San Jose, California, it is a resident of that State.
See Ring Power Sys. v. Int’l De Comercio y Consultoria, 39 S.W.3d 350, 355 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (“A corporation’s residence is the place where its corporate
affairs are conducted—its principal place of business.”).

5

district court as a multi-jurisdictional “inspector general.” But see Trooper, 2013
WL 9600953, at *5.
Mary Kay did not establish, in its Petition or at hearing, that a Texas court
would have personal jurisdiction over any of the anonymous internet users.
Moreover, Mary Kay’s Rule 202 Petition is vague about the specific claims it
anticipates bringing against any of the 48 anonymous eBay users. CR9. In fact,
the Petition is unclear whether Mary Kay actually anticipates suing all of these
anonymous users and, if so, what such a suit (or suits) might look like. Id. The
evidence Mary Kay submitted to the district court suggests that the anonymous
eBay users are unrelated and independent actors, selling different products under
different usernames. See Ex. 1A & 1B to 3RR5 (sample eBay listings of 48
anonymous users). Mary Kay does not even allege that all of these users are
Beauty Consultants or, if not, how their listings might infringe Mary Kay’s
intellectual property rights (and, thus, which statutes are at issue).

Rather, Mary

Kay contends that such considerations are not proper matters of inquiry under Rule
202. CR112; but see Trooper, 2013 WL 9600953, at *3 (Rule 202 cannot be used
to perpetuate testimony for use in suits alleging federal intellectual property
claims).

6

eBay opposed Mary Kay’s Rule 202 Petition on various grounds.

In

addition to the issues raised in this appeal, eBay argued that Mary Kay had failed
to show that it could not identify any of these 48 anonymous eBay users through its
own investigations.

CR25.

eBay also showed that Mary Kay’s interest in

obtaining the removal of listings that infringed its intellectual property rights was
well-served through eBay’s Verified Rights Owners (“VeRO”) program. CR16667. Under the VeRO program, a company may notify eBay of a listing that
infringes its copyright or trademark rights. CR166. In response to a legitimate
request, eBay may take various actions, ranging from the identification of an eBay
user selling counterfeit items (e.g., fake “Mary Kay” products) to rapid takedown
of listings that violate a company’s intellectual property rights in images and text
(e.g., use of Mary Kay photography or proprietary product descriptions).5 CR16667. Mary Kay has been a member of VeRO for almost 15 years. CR166. During
the past year alone, eBay has voluntarily removed approximately 600 listings from
its site in response to Mary Kay’s requests. Id.
C.

The Court’s Rule 202 Order

5

Since 2013, eBay has not identified users whose listings are removed under the “image and
text” takedown procedures. CR167. eBay does comply with valid subpoenas pursuant to
Section 512(h) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, through which companies may obtain
the identities of infringing users. Id.

7

After conducting a hearing, the Honorable Martin Lowy, Judge of the 101st
District Court of Dallas County, granted Mary Kay’s Rule 202 Petition. 3RR2325; CR179-80 (Tab A). The district court’s Order specifically requires eBay to
travel to Texas to provide its testimony regarding the name, address, telephone
number, fax number, and email address associated with each of the 48 anonymous
eBay users listed in Mary Kay’s Petition. CR180. The Order has been stayed
pending the resolution of this appeal.

CR216-17; 6/26/14 Order Granting

Appellant’s Emergency Stay.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court’s order granting a deposition under Rule 202 is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. See Patton Boggs LLP v. Moseley, 394 S.W.3d 565, 571 (Tex.
App.—Dallas, 2011, no pet.). A trial court has no discretion in determining the
law or in applying the law to the facts, even when the law is unsettled. In re
Jorden, 249 S.W.3d at 424.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This is one of a growing number of cases in which multi-level marketing
companies are attempting to use Rule 202 as an extraterritorial “super subpoena,”
to obtain the identities of hundreds—and sometimes thousands—of anonymous
website users from across the county (and, possibly, around the world) in a single
Rule 202 action. These companies claim to need this mass discovery in order to
8

perpetuate testimony for use in anticipated suits against any anonymous website
users who are revealed to be licensed distributors in breach of their distribution
contracts or who are infringing the companies’ intellectual property rights. See
Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.1(a). As the world’s largest online marketplace, eBay is a
primary target for this mass discovery.
Here, the district court ordered California-based eBay to submit to
deposition in Texas to identify 48 anonymous, unrelated users of its website.6
CR178-181. The district court’s Order must be reversed and vacated and Mary
Kay’s Petition must be dismissed with prejudice under the Texas Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Trooper, which reaffirmed that Rule 202 cannot be used as an
end-run around procedural rules and limitations that would apply in the anticipated
suit. 2013 WL 9600953, at *4-5. In Trooper, the Supreme Court held that the
petitioner could not use Rule 202 to obtain the identity of an anonymous blogger

6

In another case now pending before the Court, the district court ordered eBay to submit to
deposition in Texas to identify 169 anonymous users. See eBay, Inc. v. Origami Owl, LLC, No.
05-14-00788-CV. In yet another, the district court ordered it to submit to deposition in Texas to
identify more than 200 users. See eBay, Inc. v. Zurvita, Inc., No. 05-14-00925-CV. And in the
most recent case to be appealed to this Court, eBay was ordered to submit to deposition in Texas
to identify more than 15,000 anonymous users. See eBay, Inc. v. Beachbody, No. 05-14-01178CV. eBay will file a motion for judicial notice of certain documents in the files of other Rule
202 appeals currently pending before this Court and before the district courts of Dallas County
and Collin County. See In re Estate of Clark, 198 S.W.3d 273, 275 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006,
review denied) (court properly takes judicial notice of its own files and pleadings); see also
Brown v. Brown, 145 S.W.3d 745, 750 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied) (court may take
judicial notice of the records in another court when it is provided copies of those records).

9

for an anticipated defamation suit, without a showing that Texas courts could
exercise personal jurisdiction over the anonymous blogger. Id. at *3-5.
Here, Mary Kay failed to make such a showing, ignoring eBay’s point that
“[m]any of these eBay sellers appear to be from outside Texas and therefore might
not be subject to suit here.” CR23.

Mary Kay has made no effort to limit its

discovery to Texas residents or to plead allegations that would support the exercise
of personal jurisdiction over nonresident sellers by a Texas court. But see Trooper,
2013 9600953, at *5 (“The burden is on the plaintiff in an action to plead
allegations showing personal jurisdiction over the defendant.”).
More broadly, Mary Kay made no effort to show that it could properly
maintain a suit against any one of these 48 anonymous internet users under Texas
rules. Mary Kay does not allege that any of these eBay sellers are related to each
other in any way or that they are working in concert. CR22. Nor has Mary Kay
established that these anonymous eBay sellers are Beauty Consultants who signed
IBC agreements prohibiting them from selling on eBay.

Id.

Mary Kay’s

aggregation of these 48 apparently unrelated anonymous users into a single Rule
202 action is an attempt to expand pre-suit discovery far beyond any discovery that
Mary Kay could obtain in any actual pending suit and to mask the deficiencies in
its allegations as to each specific user. Particularly in light of Trooper, Mary

10

Kay’s Petition should have been denied and dismissed for failure to comply with
Rule 202.
Even if Mary Kay could demonstrate that its anticipated suit could be
maintained properly in a Texas court, Rule 202 does not authorize a Texas court to
reach outside the State’s borders to force a nonparty, nonresident witness to give
testimony without first obtaining the authorization of the courts in the witness’s
home jurisdiction. Rather, Mary Kay must proceed through a well-established,
two-step process that applies pre-suit and in pending suits. The Texas procedures
for obtaining the deposition of nonresident, nonparty witness in a pending case are
explicitly set forth in Rule 201.1. But compliance with Texas rules is only one step
in a two-step process. The first comment to Rule 201 warns:
Rule 201.1 sets forth procedures for obtaining deposition
testimony of a witness in another state or foreign
jurisdiction for use in Texas court proceedings. It does
not, however, address whether any of the procedures
listed are, in fact, permitted or recognized by the law of
the state or foreign jurisdiction where the witness is
located. A party must first determine what procedures
are permitted by the jurisdiction where the witness is
located before using this rule.
Cmt. 1 to Tex. R. Civ. P. 201.1 (emphasis added). These procedures are based on
basic principles of comity between states, including the recognition that a state
court’s subpoena power stops at that state’s border. See Corliss v. Smith, 560
S.W.2d 166, 173 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1977, no writ) (“[A] Texas court has no
11

subpoena power to compel the attendance of the witnesses residing in [another
state].”). Simply put, there is no such thing as “long-arm” subpoena power.
These rules and limitations also apply to pre-suit depositions under Rule
202. In fact, Rule 202.5 expressly states that “depositions authorized by [Rule
202] are governed by the rules applicable to depositions of nonparties in a pending
suit.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.5. Furthermore, the Texas Supreme Court has held that
Rule 202 may not be used as “an end-run around discovery limitations that would
govern the anticipated suit[.]” In re Wolfe, 341 S.W.3d 932, 933 (Tex. 2011).
The trial court’s order forcing eBay to travel to Texas to submit to a
deposition in connection with an anticipated suit in which it would not be a party
violates these well-established rules and limitations. Whereas Mary Kay would be
required to obtain a letter rogatory or similar order in the pending-suit context, and
then issue a subpoena under California law to obtain its requested deposition, see
Rule 201.1 & Cmt. 1, the district court’s Order purports to reach directly into
California and attempts to require a company residing there to be deposed in
Texas. This cannot be done.
A Texas court simply has no power to issue such an order, either in the
pending-suit context or in the pre-suit context. Mary Kay cannot identify any
statute or other source of law that gives the district court such broad,

12

extraterritorial discovery powers. Accordingly, the district court’s Order should be
reversed and vacated, and Mary Kay’s Rule 202 Petition should be denied and
dismissed with prejudice.
ARGUMENT
As the Texas Supreme Court recognized in Trooper, Rule 202 “covers the
subjects of two repealed rules, Rule 187, permitting discovery to perpetuate
testimony, and Rule 737, providing for a bill of discovery.” 2013 WL 9600953, at
*2. Here, Mary Kay proceeds under Rule 202.1(a), the successor to Rule 187 and
the long-standing practice in Texas and other states “of taking discovery to
perpetuate testimony in imminent danger of being lost, such as by the death or
departure of the witness, for use in a later-filed suit.” Id.; CR7. Consistent with
this purpose, Rule 202.5 restricts pre-suit discovery in aid of an anticipated suit
“‘the same as if the anticipated suit . . . had been filed.’” In re Wolfe, 341 S.W.3d
at 933 (quoting Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.5).

Similarly, Rule 202.5 expressly

incorporates the rules and limitations governing discovery from nonparties in
pending suits. Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.5. Here, the district court erred by granting presuit discovery that Mary Kay could never obtain in any pending suit and by
ignoring the proper procedures for obtaining the testimony of a nonresident,
nonparty witness like eBay.
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A.

Trooper Confirms that Rule 202 Does Not Authorize Pre-Suit
Discovery that Would Be Unobtainable in the Anticipated Suit.

As the Texas Supreme Court explained in Trooper, Rule 202 does not “make
Texas the world’s inspector general.” 2013 WL 9600953 at 5. Moreover, it “does
not guarantee access to information for every petitioner who claims to need it.” Id.
A district court’s exercise of discretion under Rule 202 must be limited by rules
and principles, to ensure that the court’s “power to compel testimony [is not]
limited only by its grasp over witnesses.” Id. at *4. Foremost among these
limitations is the requirement that a court deciding a Rule 202 petition have the
power and ability to adjudicate the anticipated suit for which the “pre-suit”
discovery is being requested. Id. As Chief Justice Hecht noted in Trooper, this
requirement has long been a feature of the statutory predecessors to Rule
202.2(b)(1), which governs discovery to perpetuate testimony for use in an
anticipated suit. Id. at *2.
In application, this means that the Rule 202 court “must have subject-matter
jurisdiction over the anticipated action.” Id. at *3. For example, Rule 202 cannot
be used to investigate federal claims. Id. In addition, a Rule 202 petitioner must
allege facts sufficient to make a prima facie showing that the court has personal
jurisdiction over the anticipated defendant—even if the petitioner does not yet
know the defendant’s identity. Id.
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Texas procedural rules that would govern the anticipated suit also limit the
discovery available under Rule 202. In re Wolfe, 341 S.W.3d at 933 (Rule 202
may not be used as an “end-run around discovery limitations that would govern the
anticipated suit”). The Texas Supreme Court has twice vacated Rule 202 orders
that allowed petitioners to obtain discovery in the pre-suit context that they would
not have been able to obtain as a plaintiff in a pending suit. Id.; see also In re
Jorden, 249 S.W.3d at 424.
In Wolfe, the petitioner sought pre-suit discovery to investigate a potential
claim for removal of a county official. Id. at 932. Under Texas procedural rules,
such an action could not be prosecuted—and thus discovery could not be taken—
except through joinder of a state official, which the petitioner had failed to do in
the Rule 202 proceeding. Id. The trial court granted the Rule 202 petition, but the
Texas Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order. Id. at 932-33. In doing so,
the Supreme Court held that the same limitations that would apply to discovery in
a pending suit also applied to Rule 202 discovery in support of that suit. Id. at 933
(citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.5).
Similarly, in Jorden, the petitioner sought pre-suit discovery under Rule 202
for use in an anticipated medical malpractice suit. Id. at 419-20. Under Texas
rules, a plaintiff in a pending medical malpractice suit may not take discovery until
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she serves an expert report supporting her claims against the defendant. Id. at 420
(citing Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code § 74.351(s)). The Texas Supreme Court applied
this limitation in the Rule 202 context, holding that the petitioner could not obtain
a pre-suit deposition of the targeted medical providers without having served the
expert report that would be required prior to the commencement of discovery in the
anticipated malpractice case. Id. at 424.
Relying on this precedent, the First Court of Appeals recently held that a
potential plaintiff in a retaliation suit under the Texas Labor Code could not obtain
pre-suit discovery to investigate her claims, without first satisfying the exhaustionof-remedies requirement that would apply in a pending retaliation suit. See In re
Bailey-Newell, --S.W.3d--, 2014 WL 2779420, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] June 19, 2014, orig. proceeding) (vacating trial court order granting Rule
202 petition). And earlier this year, the Second Court of Appeals relied on Wolfe
and Jorden in holding that the heightened “necessity” requirements in Rule of
Evidence 507 for obtaining discovery of trade-secret information in pending cases
also applied in the Rule 202 pre-suit context. See In re PrairieSmarts LLC, 421
S.W.3d 296, 305 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, orig. proceeding) (vacating trial
court order granting Rule 202 deposition). In short, as the Thirteenth Court of
Appeals observed, “Rule 202 was not intended as a means of obtaining otherwise
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unobtainable discovery.” In re Reassure Am. Life Ins. Co., 421 S.W.3d 165, 172
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2013, orig. proceeding) (vacating trial court order
granting Rule 202 deposition).
B.

The Mass Discovery Ordered by the District Court Would Be
Unobtainable in Any Actual Pending Suit.

Here, Mary Kay’s Rule 202 Petition is improperly designed to obtain
discovery that it would be denied in any actual pending suit. Texas joinder rules
would prohibit Mary Kay from using a single “Doe” suit to obtain the identities of
48 unrelated eBay users. Under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 40(a), joinder is
improper unless the claims arise out of the “same transaction, occurrence, or series
of transactions or occurrences” and there is a common question of law or fact. In
re Levi Strauss & Co., 959 S.W.2d 700, 704 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, no writ).
And if Mary Kay were to sue any single eBay user (or any subgroup of them), it
could not obtain discovery relating to other, unrelated eBay users. See Tex. R. Civ.
P. 192.3(a) (discovery must be “relevant to the subject matter of the pending
action”).
As Trooper demonstrates, this is not just a procedural cavil. By seeking
mass discovery through a single Rule 202 action, Mary Kay attempts to evade
important limits on the district court’s authority to order pre-suit discovery. For
example, as eBay argued in the district court, Mary Kay improperly seeks
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discovery from eBay users who appear (based on their public eBay profiles) to be
from outside the State, and thus possibly outside the jurisdiction of a Texas court.
CR23 (“[M]any of these eBay sellers appear to be from outside Texas and
therefore might not be subject to suit here.”); see, e.g., CR93 (profile of eBay user
from Bolivar, Ohio). Under Trooper, however, a Rule 202 petitioner must “plead
allegations showing personal jurisdiction over the [anticipated] defendant.” 2013
WL 9600953 at *5. Mary Kay has not even attempted to comply with this
requirement. It does not limit its discovery to Texas residents, and it makes no
allegations that these 48 users are subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas.7 Mary
Kay should not be allowed to avoid Trooper’s requirements by aggregating
multiple, unrelated users into a single Rule 202 action, when these users could
never be properly joined defendants in any single pending suit brought by Mary
Kay.
In essence, application of joinder rules that would govern the anticipated
action helps ensure that Rule 202’s requirements are taken seriously and that Rule
202 is not abused to the detriment of anticipated defendants and witnesses. If a
potential plaintiff cannot show that a Rule 202 petition should be granted as to a

7

Moreover, Trooper holds that the requested pre-suit discovery must be related to a claim over
which a Texas court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at *3. Although Mary Kay contends that
listings by the 48 eBay users infringe its intellectual property rights, it makes no attempt to tie
specific allegations of infringement to specific users to support subject-matter jurisdiction.
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single anonymous internet user—e.g., because of personal jurisdiction or subjectmatter jurisdiction problems—that defect cannot be cured by the addition of 47
unrelated anonymous internet users and the vague allegation that the potential
plaintiff anticipates suing “one or more” of them. But see CR9 (“Mary Kay seeks
to take a deposition on written questions of eBay in anticipation of claims against
one or more of these persons and entities . . . .”) (emphasis added). At a minimum,
a Rule 202 petition must show that all of the discovery being sought would be
obtainable in a pending suit. If the discovery concerns the identities of anonymous
internet users, the Rule 202 petition must show that the requirements of Rule 202
have been satisfied as to each of them. Otherwise, Rule 202 is transformed into
exactly what the Texas Supreme Court has said it is not: “an end within itself.” In
re Wolfe, 341 S.W.3d at 933.
Here, given the absence of any showing by Mary Kay that there is an
anticipated suit in which it would be able to obtain this mass discovery, and given
the absence of any specific allegations in Mary Kay’s Petition that would satisfy
Rule 202’s requirements for obtaining discovery as to each of the 48 anonymous
users, the district court abused its discretion in granting Mary Kay’s Rule 202
Petition.
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C.

Texas Courts Do Not Have Extraterritorial Power under Rule 202
to Compel the Testimony of a Nonresident Witness for Use in an
Anticipated Suit in which the Witness Would Not Be a Party.

Based on the above, the district court’s Order should be vacated, and Mary
Kay’s Rule 202 Petition should be denied and dismissed. But even if Mary Kay
could satisfy the other requirements of Rule 202, the district court’s Order runs
afoul of Rule 202.5 and basic principles of comity by ordering eBay, a nonresident,
to submit to deposition in Texas in connection with a suit in which eBay would not
be a party.
Rule 202.5 expressly incorporates the rules and limitations that govern
nonparty depositions in pending suits:
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, depositions
authorized by this rule are governed by the rules
applicable to depositions of nonparties in a pending suit.
The scope of discovery in depositions authorized by this
rule is the same as if the anticipated suit or potential
claim had been filed.
Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.5 (emphasis added). Despite this clear mandate, Mary Kay
argued:
A reading of Rule 202.5 in its entirety reveals, however,
that it imposes limitations only on the ‘scope’ of
depositions . . . . In other words, Rule 202.5 limits only
the matters of inquiry under—not the procedure for
obtaining—a deposition pursuant to Rule 202. The
procedure for obtaining the deposition is explicitly
covered in Rule 202 itself.
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CR110 (emphasis added). This argument ignores the plain language of Rule 202.5.
Indeed, the first sentence of the rule addresses procedures governing “nonparty”
depositions (e.g., the issuance of subpoenas). It is only the second sentence of the
rule that relates to the substantive “scope” of pre-suit depositions. Mary Kay’s
interpretation of Rule 202.5 is inconsistent with the cases cited above, see supra at
14-17, all of which involved procedural rules and limitations that were held to
apply in pre-suit depositions despite not being “explicitly covered by Rule 202
itself.” CR110.
In sum, Rule 202.5 means what it says: Pre-suit depositions are “governed
by the rules applicable to depositions of nonparties in a pending suit.” Tex. R. Civ.
P. 202.5. Accordingly, Mary Kay’s suggestion to the district court that it need not
“comply with the nonparty deposition procedures provided in Rule 201,” see
CR110, invited error. And the district court’s Order, which does not comply with
Rule 201, is fatally undermined by that error.
The process that Mary Kay must follow (assuming it can otherwise satisfy
Rule 202) is clear.

Rule 201.1, which governs “Depositions in Foreign

Jurisdictions for Use in Texas Proceedings,” allows a Texas court to issue a letter
rogatory or similar order permitting the party in the Texas proceeding to obtain a
deposition in a foreign jurisdiction. Tex. R. Civ. P. 201.1. But because the taking
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of the deposition in a foreign jurisdiction must comply with the law of that
jurisdiction, “[a] party must first determine what procedures are permitted by the
jurisdiction where the witness is located[.]” Cmt. 1 to Tex. R. Civ. P. 201.1. See
NATHAN L. HECHT & ROBERT H. PEMBERTON, A GUIDE

TO THE

1999 TEXAS

DISCOVERY RULES REVISIONS, at G-16, Nov. 11, 1998, available at
http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/rules/tdr/disccle37.pdf. (“Comment 1 also
clarifies the relationship between this rule and the law of foreign jurisdictions
where the witnesses are located.”); see also Feltham v. Bell Helicopter Textron,
Inc., 41 S.W.3d 384, 388 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) (“We know, by
reference to Rule 201.1 . . . . that Texas courts have procedures by which
depositions may be taken in foreign jurisdictions for use in Texas proceedings,
assuming those procedures are permitted or recognized by the law of the state or
foreign jurisdiction where the witness is located.”).8
This mandatory two-step process is based on a fundamental principle of
comity: a state court’s subpoena power ends at the state border. A Texas court
does not have the power to compel a nonresident witness to submit to deposition in

8

Like Texas, California permits a civil litigant in an action pending outside the State to obtain a
subpoena from a court inside the State in order to secure discovery from a witness residing there.
See Cal. C.C.P. §§ 2029.100-.900 et seq.; cf. Tex. R. Civ. P. 201.2 (allowing reciprocal
procedure for depositions of Texas residents for use in foreign proceedings). Mary Kay admits,
however, that California law would not permit the type of pre-suit discovery it seeks here.
CR112.
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Texas. See Corliss, 560 S.W.2d at 173; Ryan W. Scott, Minimum Contacts, No
Dog: Evaluating Personal Jurisdiction for Nonparty Discovery, 88 Minn. L. Rev.
968, 984 (2004) (“Most states retain strict limits on the reach of the subpoena
power, holding that subpoena service cannot reach nonparties found outside the
state.”). Consistent application of this rule across jurisdictions protects Texas
residents from having to travel to another state to provide deposition testimony.
See, e.g., In re Prince, No. 14-06-00895-CV, 2006 WL 3589484, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 12, 2006, no pet.) (“Because Prince resides in
Houston, the California court in which the divorce proceeding is pending did not
have the power to issue a subpoena to compel Prince to appear for a deposition.”).
Mary Kay’s attempts to excuse itself from complying with this fundamental
rule of procedure based on eBay’s contacts with Texas and its service of eBay’s
registered agent for Texas both fail. In the district court, Mary Kay suggested that
eBay’s “immense physical presence in Texas” rendered Rule 201.1 inapplicable.
CR110. But this argument confuses two distinct concepts: subpoena power and
personal jurisdiction. It is well-established that the territorial limitations on a state
court’s subpoena power do not depend on whether the nonresident witness is
subject to personal jurisdiction in the state. See Colorado Mills, LLC v. SunOpta
Grains & Foods Inc., 269 P.3d 731, 733 n.3, 734 (Colo. 2012) (“Nor have we
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found any authority applying our long-arm statute, or the long-arm statute of any
other state for that matter, to enforce a civil subpoena against an out-of-state
nonparty.”); Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 908 So.2d 121, 127 (Miss.
2005) (finding no statutory authority that would allow court to compel nonresident,
nonparty to produce documents in forum state); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. OKC
Ltd. P’Ship, 634 So.2d 1186, 1188 (La. 1994) (“Whereas the long-arm statute
extends Louisiana’s personal jurisdiction over persons or legal entities beyond
Louisiana’s borders, there is no similar authority for extending the subpoena power
of a Louisiana court beyond state lines to command in-state attendance of [out-ofstate] nonparty witnesses.”); Rhonda Wasserman, The Subpoena Power:
Pennoyer’s Last Vestige, 74 Minn. L. Rev. 37, 39 (1989) (“Regardless of the
distance between the witness and the courthouse, the amount of contact the witness
has with the state, or the need for live testimony, the states uniformly and
steadfastly have refrained from exercising extraterritorial subpoena power.”).
Accordingly, even if Mary Kay were able to show that Texas courts could exercise
personal jurisdiction over eBay,9 that showing would not extend a Texas court’s

9

Even if principles of personal jurisdiction were relevant here, Mary Kay has made no showing
that eBay is subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas in connection with an anticipated suit
against unknown eBay users. Specific jurisdiction would not apply, as no claims against eBay
are being asserted (and therefore no conduct by eBay in Texas gives rise to claims against eBay).
See Moki Mac River Expeditions v Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 576 (Tex. 2007) (“Specific
jurisdiction is established if the defendant’s alleged liability ‘aris[es] out of or [is] related to’ an
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subpoena power across state lines. See Ulloa v. CMI, Inc., 133 So.3d 914, 920
(Fla. 2013) (“Even if [the corporate witness] is subject to the personal jurisdiction
of Florida courts under the long-arm statute, this does not mean that [it] is required
to respond to a subpoena to appear and/or to produce documents in a Florida court
in a criminal case in which it is not a party.”).
Mary Kay’s suggestion that it did not have to comply with Rule 201 because
it served its Rule 202 Petition on eBay’s registered agent for Texas also fails for
lack of any supporting authority. Under Texas law, a nonresident corporation’s
appointment of a registered agent in Texas does not transform that corporation into
a Texas resident. See Moni Pulo Ltd. v. Trutec Oil & Gas, Inc., 130 S.W.3d 170,
175 n.7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (“Although Texas
law requires nonresident corporations to appoint a registered agent with a Texas
address, they remain nonresidents.”). This is particularly true where, as here, the
registered agent is not a corporate employee or custodian of the records being
sought. See Phillips, 634 So.2d at 1188 & n.6 (rejecting argument that nonparty,
“having qualified to do business in this state and having designated an agent for
service of process, is the equivalent of a ‘resident’ of Louisiana, thus subjecting the
activity conducted within the forum.”) (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984)). And the United States Supreme Court has recently limited
general jurisdiction such that, absent extreme circumstances, a corporation is not subject to
general jurisdiction outside the state of its principal place of business, or “home.” See Daimler
AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760-61 (2014).
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corporation to the subpoena power of a Louisiana court”); Ulloa, 133 So.3d at 920
(“The registered agent has a limited role, and is not a corporate employee or
custodian of corporate records.”). After all, Mary Kay is not seeking to depose
eBay’s registered agent; it wants to depose eBay.10
The Second Court of Appeals has applied these principles in a closely
analogous context. In Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc. v. Dauphinot, 794 S.W.2d 608
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1990, orig. proceeding), the trial court refused to quash a
subpoena served on the registered agent for Reader’s Digest, a large out-of-state
publisher. Id. at 609. In denying the publisher’s motion to quash, the trial court
used the same reasoning that Mary Kay in the district court:
The Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that proper
service of the subpoena has been had on Reader’s Digest,
through its registered agent in Texas, and that Reader’s
Digest has been properly served to appear in this Court
and to produce the records called for by the subpoena.
Id. at 609-10. Reader’s Digest filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to
vacate the trial court’s order and to quash the subpoena because the procedures for

10

For this reason, Mary Kay’s reliance on Tex. R. Civ. P. 176.3, which governs the location of a
deposition by providing that a “person may not be required by subpoena to appear or produce
documents or other things in a county that is more than 150 miles from where the person resides
or is served” is misplaced. eBay’s residence is more than 150 miles from Texas, and Mary Kay
cannot transform eBay into a Texas resident by considering eBay’s registered agent to be the
“person” subpoenaed as a witness.
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obtaining discovery from a nonresident witness11 had not been followed. Id. at
610. In granting Reader’s Digest’s petition for writ of mandamus, the Second
Court of Appeals held:
[R]espondent[s] argue that article 24.28 applies only to
‘persons who truly have no contact with the State of
Texas’ and state that relator ‘has more than significant
contact with Texas through its business dealings because
its employees and agents reside in Texas and conduct its
corporate business on a daily basis.’ This argument is
not supported by citation to any authority, nor do we
know of any.
Id. (emphasis added).
Like the petitioner in Reader’s Digest, Mary Kay has failed to cite any
authority for its argument that service on eBay’s registered agent and eBay’s Texas
“presence” excuse its noncompliance with Rule 201.1 and the letter-rogatory
process set forth in that rule. As demonstrated above, the reason no such authority
exists is because Texas courts do not have the power to force a nonresident,
nonparty witness like eBay to submit to deposition in this State—whether in the
pre-suit context or pending suit-context.

11

See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRAC. art. 24.28 (“Uniform Act to Secure Attendance of Witnesses from
Without State”).
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CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
For the foregoing reasons, eBay respectfully requests that the Court reverse
the judgment of the district court, vacate the district court’s Order, and deny and
dismiss Mary Kay’s Rule 202 Petition with prejudice.
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EXHIBIT A

CAUSE NO. DC-14-03318
IN RE: MARY KAY INC.,
A Delaware corporation,

§
§
§

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

Petitioner.
(eBay Inc.)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

§
§
§
§

101 S T JUDICIAL DISTRICT

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER MARY KAY'S REQUEST FOR PRE-SUIT
DEPOSITION OF EBAY INC.
On May 14, 2014, came on to be considered Petitioner Mary Kay Inc.'s Verified Rule
202 Petition ("Petition"), whereby Petitioner seeks to take the deposition of eBay Inc. The Court
has considered the Petition, the opposition thereto, Petitioner's reply, the evidence submitted by
the parties, and oral argument.
The Court finds that allowing Petitioner to take the requested deposition will prevent a
failure or delay of justice in Petitioner's anticipated suit.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner's request to depose eBay Inc. pursuant to
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202 is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that eBay Inc. shall provide to Petitioner the name, address,
telephone number, fax number, and email address associated with each of the following eBay
usemames:
birdie60
marykay 4u
its now-sold
ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER MARY KAY'S
REQUEST FOR PRE-SUIT DEPOSITION OF EBAY INC

1629814 1

makin u pretty
cptking68
everythingatmc

biglousnovelties
magnoliamoments
Mamamarie8283
Pagel

doubledutchranch2005
kimspieceofparadise2009
mlc 122074
i-love-pink-cosmetics-101
inhootca
crackers37
simpletreasurel23
gasper003
globalglam4you
feeling-pretty-good
marie harley
mrsells6678
pezlok58

firisbeegirlSO
lil-suzy-82
valmarco66
smartsuperstore2010
mkalpiniste
Discountwholesalewarehouse
amazing deals for_you
cosmeticsstoregalore
rosemaryribbons
texas great deals
locktenenterprises
.jenniepeanut3
gracefully 13

techwarriorprincess
miriam kay
snuka369
zcatcat
candylandsquare
myguest
consigned_treasures
tobomot2bl
tmanl271
estore2
suppliesindemand
soulwinner2013
999football999

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that eBay Inc. shall provide the information described in
the foregoing paragraph by deposition upon written questions within thirty (30) days from the
date of this Order. Notice of the deposition shall be served upon eBay Inc.'s counsel, and the
deposition shall occur in the office of eBay Inc.'s counsel, located at 2001 Ross Avenue, Suite
3700, Dallas, Texas 75201.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner shall use the information obtained during the
deposition only in connection with its anticipated suit, including for the purpose of serving
demand letters to the eBay users listed above, filing suit against those users, and/or filing
Petitions pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202 to obtain further information regarding
those users.
Because eBay Inc. would not be a party in Petitioner's anticipated suit, this order is final
and appealable.
SIGNED*

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER MARY KAY'S
REQUEST FOR PRE-SUIT DEPOSITION OF EBAY INC.

1629814 1

^

_

2014

AGREED AS TO FORM;

Is/ Preston R. Mundt
Preston R. Mundt
State Bar. No. 24058465
preston.mundt@kellyhart.com
Bryan T. Davis
State Bar No. 24069575
bryan.davis@kellyhart.com
KELLY HART & HALLMAN LLP
201 Main Street, Suite 2500
Fort Worth, Texas 76102
Telephone: (817)332-2500
Telecopy: (817) 878-9280
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER

/s/Marc A. Fuller
Marc A. Fuller
State Bar No. 24032210
mfuller@velaw. com
VINSON & ELKINS L.L.P.
2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700
Dallas, TX 75201-2975
Telephone: 214.220.7881
Facsimile: 214.999.7881
ATTORNEYS FOR EBAY INC.

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER MARY KAY'S
REQUEST FOR PRE-SUIT DEPOSITION OF EBAY INC

1629814 1

Page 3

EXHIBIT B

Page 1

Vernon's Texas Rules Annotated Currentness
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
Part II. Rules of Practice in District and County Courts
Section 9. Evidence and Discovery (Refs & Annos)
B. Discovery
Rule 202. Depositions Before Suit or to Investigate Claims (Refs & Annos)
202.1. Generally
A person may petition the court for an order authorizing the taking of a deposition on oral examination or written
questions either:
(a) to perpetuate or obtain the person's own testimony or that of any other person for use in an anticipated suit; or
(b) to investigate a potential claim or suit.
202.2. Petition
The petition must:
(a) be verified;
(b) be filed in a proper court of any county:
(1) where venue of the anticipated suit may lie, if suit is anticipated; or
(2) where the witness resides, if no suit is yet anticipated;
(c) be in the name of the petitioner;
(d) state either:
(1) that the petitioner anticipates the institution of a suit in which the petitioner may be a party; or
(2) that the petitioner seeks to investigate a potential claim by or against petitioner;
(e) state the subject matter of the anticipated action, if any, and the petitioner's interest therein;

© 2014 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Page 2

(f) if suit is anticipated, either:
(1) state the names of the persons petitioner expects to have interests adverse to petitioner's in the anticipated suit,
and the addresses and telephone numbers for such persons; or
(2) state that the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of persons petitioner expects to have interests adverse to
petitioner's in the anticipated suit cannot be ascertained through diligent inquiry, and describe those persons;
(g) state the names, addresses and telephone numbers of the persons to be deposed, the substance of the testimony
that the petitioner expects to elicit from each, and the petitioner's reasons for desiring to obtain the testimony of
each; and
(h) request an order authorizing the petitioner to take the depositions of the persons named in the petition.

202.3. Notice and Service
(a) Personal Service on Witnesses and Persons Named. At least 15 days before the date of the hearing on the petition, the petitioner must serve the petition and a notice of the hearing--in accordance with Rule 21a--on all persons
petitioner seeks to depose and, if suit is anticipated, on all persons petitioner expects to have interests adverse to
petitioner's in the anticipated suit.
(b) Service by Publication on Persons Not Named.
(1) Manner. Unnamed persons described in the petition whom the petitioner expects to have interests adverse to
petitioner's in the anticipated suit, if any, may be served by publication with the petition and notice of the hearing.
The notice must state the place for the hearing and the time it will be held, which must be more than 14 days after the
first publication of the notice. The petition and notice must be published once each week for two consecutive weeks
in the newspaper of broadest circulation in the county in which the petition is filed, or if no such newspaper exists, in
the newspaper of broadest circulation in the nearest county where a newspaper is published.
(2) Objection to Depositions Taken on Notice by Publication. Any interested party may move, in the proceeding or
by bill of review, to suppress any deposition, in whole or in part, taken on notice by publication, and may also attack
or oppose the deposition by any other means available.
(c) Service in Probate Cases. A petition to take a deposition in anticipation of an application for probate of a will,
and notice of the hearing on the petition, may be served by posting as prescribed by Section 33(f)(2) of the Probate
Code. The notice and petition must be directed to all parties interested in the testator's estate and must comply with
the requirements of Section 33(c) of the Probate Code insofar as they may be applicable.
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(d) Modification by Order. As justice or necessity may require, the court may shorten or lengthen the notice periods
under this rule and may extend the notice period to permit service on any expected adverse party.
202.4. Order
(a) Required Findings. The court must order a deposition to be taken if, but only if, it finds that:
(1) allowing the petitioner to take the requested deposition may prevent a failure or delay of justice in an anticipated
suit: or
(2) the likely benefit of allowing the petitioner to take the requested deposition to investigate a potential claim
outweighs the burden or expense of the procedure.
(b) Contents. The order must state whether a deposition will be taken on oral examination or written questions. The
order may also state the time and place at which a deposition will be taken. If the order does not state the time and
place at which a deposition will be taken, the petitioner must notice the deposition as required by Rules 199 [FN1] or
200. [FN2] The order must contain any protections the court finds necessary or appropriate to protect the witness or
any person who may be affected by the procedure.
[FN1] Vernon's Ann.Rules Civ.Proc., rule 199.1 et seq.
[FN2] Vernon's Ann.Rules Civ.Proc., rule 200.1 et seq.

202.5. Manner of Taking and Use
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, depositions authorized by this rule are governed by the rules applicable to
depositions of nonparties in a pending suit. The scope of discovery in depositions authorized by this rule is the same
as if the anticipated suit or potential claim had been filed. A court may restrict or prohibit the use of a deposition
taken under this rule in a subsequent suit to protect a person who was not served with notice of the deposition from
any unfair prejudice or to prevent abuse of this rule.
END OF DOCUMENT
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